


WINNING THE PEACE: POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS

**A Monograph
by**

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ABSTRACT

WINNING THE PEACE: POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS by MAJ Kenneth O. McCreedy, USA, 73 pages.

This monograph argues that the Army's focus on fighting and winning wars often obscures the equally important mission of winning the peace. In the chaos that generally follows battle, the most potent policy instrument of the government is usually the force which achieved the military victory. This means that combat soldiers can expect to have a hand in postconflict operations.

The monograph compares the experiences of the American Army in the occupation of Germany (1944-1945) and in the liberation of Panama during Operations Just Cause/Promote Liberty (1989-1990) to evaluate the postconflict missions given combat forces. The monograph then examines the way current Army doctrine addresses postconflict operations.

The monograph concludes that Army doctrine has begun to recognize the need to conduct postconflict operations. It suggests that postconflict operations should be recognized as an operation other than war mission called "stability operations." It also recommends that unit METLs include postconflict operations, and that Mission Training Plans reflect postconflict task training.

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Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations

I. Introduction

Political scientist Fred Charles Iklé propounded an unyielding truth in the title he gave his book: Every War Must End. Yet professional soldiers often seem surprised by the outbreak of peace. War is the *raison d'être* of armies. The U.S. Army rightfully asserts that its primary mission is to fight and win the nation's wars. Leaders adjure soldiers not to lose their warfighting edge and seek to inspire a "warrior spirit" among them. Military training and doctrine focus on warfighting. Indeed, the Army's "how-to" training manual, FM 25-101, is entitled Battle-Focused Training.

The end of active combat, however, initiates another phase of operations which is just as critical to ultimate victory as battle. B.H. Liddell Hart observed: "History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy. But as most of the thinking about war has been done by men of the military profession there has been a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and identify it with the military aim."¹ War, by destroying an enemy's will to resist, sets the conditions for attaining the objectives for the peace established by the national political authority.² Postconflict operations by the military are designed to achieve these policy objectives.

War's end rarely terminates the armed forces' mission. In the chaos that generally follows combat, the most available policy instrument of the government, one possessing requisite resources and organization to gain the desired political ends, is usually the

force which achieved the military victory. Just as it is a truism that every war must end, it is equally certain that the Army can expect to have a role in the aftermath. Among its options in the period of transition from war to peace, the government can task the military to execute a Carthaginian peace, stabilize the situation until a friendly government can assume responsibility, act as a powerful lever for diplomatic negotiations, or provide proconsuls to oversee a political transformation.

The U.S. Army has performed one or more of these functions following every major war after 1815, conducting occupations of varying duration and comprehensiveness.³ However, having focused on winning the war, it historically has been ill-prepared for postconflict operations. Political leaders, moreover, have shown reluctance to define the role they want the army to play in the peace. This is attributable to a fundamental distrust of the military arising from America's revolutionary heritage. It also reflects a genuine democratic conviction that military government, however benevolent, is an inappropriate polity. Historian Earl Ziemke wrote in reviewing America's various postwar experiences: "In each instance, neither the Army nor the government accepted it [occupation] as a legitimate military function. Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a somewhat disquieting experience for both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near disastrous."⁴

Scholars have focused their attention on war termination largely within the context of strategic postwar planning and policy-making.⁵ However, the army, as the probable executor of these

policies, should address the tactical considerations for conducting postconflict operations.⁶ For the tactical commander assigned postconflict responsibilities and for the military planner charged with anticipating these missions, it is essential to understand the scope of the tasks, the training requirements, and the challenges the transition from war to peace presents to leadership, discipline, and morale.

The American occupation of Germany, 1944-1945, offers fertile ground for an examination of tactical postconflict operations. From September 1944 to May 1945, the U.S. Army progressively occupied more of Germany while battling the *Wehrmacht* to submission. In doing so, it initiated a "belligerent occupation," thus assuming responsibility under international law for the humane treatment and administration of the territory, including performance of all governmental functions, until the U.S. could impose a satisfactory government on the defeated state.⁷ While American strategic and operational planners gave thought to organizations, procedures, and support for postconflict operations, ultimately, tactical commanders implemented these plans until relieved of responsibility by the formal establishment of a military government in August 1945. Their experience in the face of utter devastation, chaos, confusion, and conflicting priorities offers insights into what is involved in making the transition from war to peace.

Just Cause and Promote Liberty, the 1989-1990 operations to topple the regime of General Manuel Noriega and restore democratic rule to Panama respectively, offer a more recent example of

postconflict operations undertaken by the U.S. Army. The scale of the operations was much smaller than in Germany during World War II. It differed also in its nature: Just Cause aimed at the liberation of Panama, not its occupation. The U.S. Embassy emphasized from the beginning that American troops invading Panama were there to liberate the territory of an allied regime from occupying enemy forces, not to carry out an occupation.⁸ This shaped the transition from war to peace in distinctly different ways than in Germany in 1945, offering another perspective for examining the tactical roles and missions associated with postconflict operations. Together, these two events serve as useful case studies for analysis of the tactical missions, training requirements, and challenges which emerge from postconflict operations.

Soldiers concerned with preparing for the next war (and the resulting peace) turn to the Army's doctrine for guidance in what needs to be done, how it should be done, and who should do it. The introduction to the current edition of FM 100-5, Operations, asserts that "The Army's doctrine lies at the heart of its professional competence."⁹ Doctrine, the manual emphasizes, is not static. It draws on diverse sources to constantly measure itself against experience in an attempt to "get it about right," in historian Michael Howard's apt phrase.¹⁰ Doctrine is important because it represents an authoritative statement about how the Army collectively thinks, as well as expressing how it "intends to conduct war and operations other than war."¹¹ Therefore, the decision about what is and what is not included in doctrine is significant. This monograph examines current Army doctrine for the conduct of postconflict operations and

measures it against the experiences gained in Germany and Panama. The Army's doctrine tells its soldiers how it expects to fight a war: it only has begun recently to teach them how to win the peace.

II. The U.S. Army Occupation of Germany, 1944-1945

On 12 September 1944, U.S. forces entered the small village of Roetgen. Tactically and strategically insignificant, the incident assumed great symbolic importance in that it became the first German territory occupied by the Allies; with its capture, postconflict operations began in Germany. On 18 September, General Dwight D. Eisenhower reacted by announcing that "Allied Military Government is established in the theater under my command to exercise in occupied German territory the supreme...authority vested in me as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and as Military Governor."¹² While the great campaign unleashed by OVERLORD was moving toward its climax, postconflict operations began to overlap combat operations.¹³

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, postconflict planning received little attention from military leaders: there were too many other competing requirements of greater immediacy. This changed in early 1944, when it occurred to operational planners in Europe that they had no contingency plan for a sudden collapse of Germany such as had occurred in 1918. The result was ECLIPSE, a plan providing for German surrender and disarmament, treatment of war criminals, handling of displaced persons, and military government.¹⁴ Tactical commanders initiated postconflict operations by implementing ECLIPSE when no longer confronted by active resistance in the areas of Germany they occupied.¹⁵

While General Eisenhower's headquarters (SHAEF) was preparing a plan for postconflict operations, it also created a

substantial civil affairs structure to assist combat commanders.¹⁶ However, with the spectacular success of the breakout from Normandy, the focus shifted to planning for military government in Germany. The Allied agreement in September 1944 on zones of occupation allowed military government detachments to prepare for pinpoint assignments in occupied Germany.¹⁷

As Allied soldiers occupied German territory, postconflict operations began and the practical problems of administering civilian populations became progressively more important than combat requirements. Small military government detachments of three to four officers and five enlisted men travelled with the lead elements of advancing forces to begin the process of political and physical reconstruction under the direction of corps and division commanders.¹⁸

They encountered scenes of utter devastation. German cities were in ruins. Rubble littered the streets. Basic services such as water, sewer, electricity, and telephones were usually not functioning. The governmental infrastructure had completely disintegrated. Police forces were skeletal at best. In this environment of chaos and devastation, military government detachments worked to recreate order. Their efforts were hampered by a shortage of German linguists and restrictions against employing any Nazis in public positions.¹⁹

By April 1945, the amount of occupied territory exceeded the capability of the one hundred fifty military government detachments created by SHAEF. The army began to transfer overstrength personnel in other branches to military government specialties in

March, but the training and organization of new detachments required time. As U.S. forces continued to push east into the Soviet designated zone, army commanders formed provisional military government detachments. The Third Army used antiaircraft, field artillery, and signal troops for this purpose, giving them a two week crash course.²⁰ However, many times the procedure was nothing more than that described by one tank lieutenant whose troops occupied a town: "I selected me a mayor who lived in that big house yonder--and he's doing all right."²¹ Tactical troops posted the occupation ordinances and the SHAEF proclamation, established population control measures such as roadblocks and curfews, and conducted security patrols.²²

The military government detachments assigned to cities, though bigger than the spearhead detachments, were too small to enforce population controls such as curfew and identification checks, establish security against looting, provide basic police services, and rebuild the infrastructure of a municipality which was largely in ruins. In Aachen, the first major German city captured (October 1944), VII Corps assigned the 690th Field Artillery Battalion to assist the military government detachment by acting as the "military government security police."²³ As occupied territory expanded and military police became overextended, other commands followed VII Corps' lead. Third Army attached a field artillery battalion to the Provost Marshall for guard duty. Seventh Army assigned the 36th Division the mission of maintaining order and guarding key installations west of the Rhine. First Army employed the 76th Division, the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade, and the 23d Tank

Destroyer Battalion to provide security in occupied areas.²⁴ When Leipzig fell on 19 April 1945, V Corps designated the commander of the 190th Field Artillery Group to take control of the city of one million inhabitants and gave him three field artillery battalions, four security guard detachments, and a provisional military government detachment (sixteen officers, twenty-four enlisted men) for occupation duty.²⁵

Despite the existence of the most extensive civil affairs-military government structure the U.S. Army has ever had, tactical commanders still played the primary role in postconflict operations because doctrinally, military operations were preeminent.²⁶ Military government detachments remained under the tactical chain of command until 1 August 1945, when U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET) established districts under military governors.²⁷ Military occupation continued until 1949, when the State Department finally assumed administrative responsibility.²⁸ As a result, in the transition from war to peace, "down at least to the regiment and battalion level, tactical commanders had more military government authority than any military government detachment."²⁹ This authority and responsibility entailed a significant number of missions for tactical units in postconflict operations. The essential ones which emerged were: preparations for redeployment; care and repatriation of displaced persons (DPs); disbandment of the German military; denazification; and security and reconstruction.

Redeployment

The mission which received the highest priority immediately after V-E Day was redeployment. It was an immense job. When the

war ended, over three million Americans were serving in the European Theater of Operations (ETO): by the end of 1945, it stood at 614,000.³⁰ There were three distinct operations involved in this mission. First, the army had to ship units to the Pacific to conclude the war against Japan.³¹ Within days of the end of the war, the army began to move units from Germany to staging areas near ports of embarkation in France. In addition, the best available equipment was gathered for shipment to make up shortages in the Far East.³² The second major redeployment task was to return troops to the United States for discharge. The pace of this operation quickened after V-J Day as political pressure built to ship soldiers home rapidly.³³ To support this effort, engineers constructed massive staging areas in France and Belgium for soldiers awaiting transportation. The final redeployment task the army faced was redistribution of units from where they had ended the war into the designated U.S. zone of occupation.³⁴

Redeployment required tremendous logistics support to move personnel, equipment, and supplies from Germany to Atlantic ports. In addition, it diverted precious engineer assets from other necessary projects such as housing for displaced persons, depots for captured materiel, and repairs to German infrastructure. Most of all, redeployment created severe personnel turmoil in units tasked to perform other missions: many outfits experienced a one hundred percent turnover between V-E Day and V-J Day.³⁵ Moreover, as organizations were deactivated, subordinate elements were reassigned to other headquarters, producing administrative nightmares. For instance, when the Ninth and Fifteenth Armies'

flags were retired, Third Army had to absorb over four hundred units.³⁶

Care and Repatriation of Displaced Persons

The next highest priority mission that U.S. tactical forces received in conducting postconflict operations was to deal with the millions of displaced persons (DPs) who had been brought against their will into the Third Reich as concentration camp inmates and forced labor for German factories and farms. Agreements reached at the Yalta conference required military commanders "to employ all practicable means to transport United Nations displaced persons to agreed locations where they could be transferred to national authorities."³⁷ U.S. forces were ill-prepared for the sheer numbers of DPs they faced: there were an estimated 2,320,000 DPs in American occupied areas on V-E Day.³⁸ Units encountered large and small groups of refugees daily as they advanced into Germany. Commanders initially emphasized caring for the almost universally malnourished and ill people they found. They arranged housing for them in German barracks, PW camps, schools, and private residences (unsympathetic American troops forced out the German owners), and they issued them food from captured stores, supplemented by U.S. military rations. Army medical teams conducted an intense public health campaign among the DPs to contain feared outbreaks of typhus and other communicable diseases.³⁹ SHAEF G-5 created fourteen special military government detachments to administer aid for the DPs.⁴⁰ Tactical commanders detailed troops to assist. Third Army, for instance, assigned service and antiaircraft units to this mission.⁴¹

Tactical units confronted a particular challenge when they liberated concentration camps. Buchenwald, with 21,000 prisoners, and Dachau, with 65,000, required significant resources. Based on experience gained at Buchenwald, Seventh Army prepared for the liberation of Dachau by appointing the G-5, XV Corps to command the camp and assigning him two field artillery batteries for security and two evacuation hospitals to provide medical services.⁴²

U.S. forces slowly sorted DPs by nationality and moved them into camps to facilitate the process of repatriation. Tactical units provided logistical and security support to the United Nations Refugee Relief Administration (UNRRA) which administered these facilities.⁴³ For example, the 161st Field Artillery Battalion supported a DP camp at Baumholder containing 17,000 Russians and the 110th Infantry ran a camp at Bad Homburg housing 7,400 Russians.⁴⁴

A number of factors combined to encourage rapid repatriation of DPs. There were political pressures within the Allied coalition to return citizens expeditiously to their homelands. The Soviets in particular demanded quick action.⁴⁵ This required a great deal of diplomacy at the tactical level in dealing with DPs. Furthermore, DPs also represented a serious threat to order. Accounts of the occupation are replete with accounts of drunkenness, looting, arson, rape, and murder by DPs celebrating their freedom and seeking to exact revenge on Germans.⁴⁶ Tactical commanders found that they had to gain control of DPs in order to impose order on their area of operations. Finally, the DPs represented a tremendous drain on resources: there was inadequate food and housing to support them

while meeting the other needs of the occupation. The scope of the problem was reflected in Third Army's official history of the occupation: "People without homes, people without food, people without proper clothing--these were what Third Army found, and there followed one of the largest tasks or [sic] organization and supply encountered in other than combat operation."⁴⁷

While the U.S. desired to repatriate DPs as quickly as possible, it faced practical limitations. Germany's overburdened rail system, already strained by redeployment, was further stressed by this requirement. Transportation units supported the effort with available trucks. Combat units assisted by establishing reception facilities at railheads and rest stops along the way to provide hot meals and medical care. For example, XXIII Corps built and maintained a rest and feeding stop along the most heavily traveled rail line to the west. The corps engineers built latrines and provided water outlets every twenty feet along the track, while medical personnel ran an aid station and delousing point.⁴⁸

By October 1945, 2.3 million displaced persons had been repatriated out of the American zone. It was a monumental task performed well. Although planning for repatriation occurred at strategic and operational levels of command, tactical commanders effectively carried out the demanding mission.⁴⁹

Disbanding the German Military

In addition to caring for and repatriating millions of DPs, U.S. forces faced another immense task: disbanding the German army and securing munitions and military equipment. By 15 April, 30,000 German soldiers were surrendering daily to the western Allies. The

number of prisoners in theater had grown from 313,000 in early April to 5,000,000 in early May.⁵⁰ Because plans had anticipated only 900,000 prisoners of war (PWs) by the end of June, there were significant shortfalls in logistics, facilities, and guards.⁵¹ SHAEF addressed the latter problem by assigning fifty officers and 4,000 enlisted men to PW duty and designating thirteen antiaircraft battalions to provide security. As an example of what this could mean at the tactical level, a first lieutenant commanding three hundred soldiers found himself in charge of a PW compound at Bad Kreuznach holding 37,000 Germans.⁵²

The logistics problem was more daunting. Transportation assets, already overtaxed and overextended, had to move supplies for these PWs. Theater food stocks were inadequate.⁵³ To reduce the number of prisoners and to assist military government detachments in restoring essential services, SHAEF directed the discharge of old men and boys from the Home Guards, and men who were coal miners, transportation and utility workers, police, and farmers, on the condition that they had no S.S. connections and posed no security risk.⁵⁴ The units charged with running the PW compounds seized on this order "to discharge as many as possible as fast as possible without a great deal of attention to categories," according to one G-1 inspection report. By 8 June, for instance, Third Army had released over half a million prisoners.⁵⁵ To aid this process, U.S. tactical forces established and manned discharge centers and reception points at railheads and transported PWs to the areas from which they had been inducted.⁵⁶

SHAEF directed the organization of remaining German prisoners of war into labor companies of two hundred fifty men and assigned them to American commands to assist in reconstruction efforts throughout western Europe: clearing rubble from the streets, burying the dead, and removing wire and minefields. Labor supervision companies made up of U.S. soldiers oversaw their efforts. The Germans in these units rarely protested, since they were fed and housed better than most of their countrymen.⁵⁷ German PWs were also used to make up shortages of drivers in U.S. transportation units and they assisted American ordnance units in preparing captured German equipment for disposal.⁵⁸

The other task involved in disbanding the German Army was disposing of the equipment and munitions which littered battlefields, collected at depots, and filled bunkers and production facilities. Little attention had been paid to captured enemy equipment before V-E Day except by souvenir hunters. After the German surrender, Army quartermasters at all levels were charged with recovering and disposing of German war materiel. They initially gave priority to destruction of enemy chemical and ammunition stocks.⁵⁹ For captured weapons and equipment, they applied the model used by the U.S. Army for disposal of surplus war materiel. Ordnance units established huge depots to receive the collected materiel: one near Wurzburg contained up to 17,000 vehicles. Each piece of equipment required inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and processing before it could be sold, shipped, or destroyed.⁶⁰ The total effort to dispose of materiel and munitions

placed further stress on increasingly scarce resources of personnel and equipment.

Denazification

At the strategic level, the mission that had the greatest long-term interest was denazification. The Allies were determined to stamp out any vestige of the Nazi Party in Germany. General Eisenhower signalled the importance attached to this effort in a speech in the fall of 1945, when he stated: "The success or failure of this occupation will be judged by the character of the Germans fifty years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time."⁶¹ The primary military instruments for executing this policy were the military government detachments charged with finding acceptable non-Nazi public officials and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) soldiers whose mission it was to find and arrest Nazis.

An immediate problem was how to define "Nazi". Was it related to a specific date, a certain rank, or did it apply to every party member regardless of activity? Guidance was initially unclear. The CIC, according to one special agent, was "given orders to arrest all Nazis from *Ortsgruppenleiter* on up, all Gestapo, all SD, all SS from *Gereiter* up."⁶² Military government detachments, desperate to find qualified personnel to assume responsibility for running German cities, counties, and states, tended to be more forgiving.⁶³ It was difficult enough to find someone with requisite skills to undertake administrative responsibility for a town; the

problem was infinitely complicated by the need to identify a politically untainted qualified applicant.

This fundamental difference in orientation could lead to conflict. The daily report from one military government detachment read: "Having trouble with CIC. Do not believe security threatened so have concentrated on assuring food, proper administration, and property protection on the assumption these will prevent unrest. Have done these at the expense of looking into past activities of present civil servants."⁶⁴ However, when the glare of media attention was turned on the occupation, it became politically intolerable to be perceived as "coddling" Nazis, and policy hardened. At the direction of General Eisenhower, military government personnel made an intense effort to screen all Germans seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces.⁶⁵ Eisenhower was willing to accept diminished administrative efficiency in return for thorough denazification.⁶⁶

Security and Reconstruction

The final major mission given to tactical units in postconflict operations was restoring and maintaining order in Germany. This required security operations to create a safe environment for the occupation and reconstruction efforts to restore essential services. Significant potential for unrest and violence existed in the wake of war. The Nazis had attempted to establish an underground resistance movement in the waning days of the war. Commanders reasonably expected freed concentration camp inmates and political opponents of the Nazis to seek retribution. They also anticipated food riots and looting in the absence of organized police forces.

On V-E Day, however, sixty-one U.S. Army divisions were in Germany. This made the initial security mission relatively simple: units dispersed and assumed responsibility for their assigned areas.⁶⁷ This meant a practical decentralization of command and control. According to Ziemke, "the company was widely viewed as the ideal unit for independent deployment because billets were easy to find and the hauls from the billets to guard posts and checkpoints would not be excessively long."⁶⁸ These troops guarded frontiers, key installations, bridges, banks, and utilities and established rapid-reaction forces to respond to disturbances.⁶⁹ Initial concerns that Nazis would establish an underground resistance proved exaggerated: CIC agents and Army troops quickly broke up one such effort, the S.S. Werewolf organization.⁷⁰ They also conducted large-scale security operations (termed "swoop" operations) to round up hiding Nazis, locate arms caches, and break-up black market operations. The most ambitious, Operation Tally-Ho, attempted to check the credentials of every person in the American zone in July 1945, and resulted in 80,000 arrests.⁷¹

U.S. tactical units also participated in projects to reconstruct destroyed German infrastructure. Engineer units rebuilt and repaired roads, bridges, electric plants, sewage treatment facilities, and waterworks. When Bonn was captured, for instance, virtually all public services were nonfunctional. Within days, gas, water, and light service had been reestablished to parts of the city, and within months, street cars were again operating.⁷² Elsewhere, water purification units provided safe drinking water. Engineers also demolished German fortifications, gun emplacements,

underground bunkers, and minefields. Construction units worked to improve living conditions of occupation forces by winterizing billets and building recreational facilities.⁷³

Summary

Tactical units contributed significantly to winning the peace in Germany. Even in the midst of active combat operations, tactical commanders were confronted with postconflict missions. Attached military government personnel dealt with some of these tasks, but they were not prepared to address the full range of missions, especially as the scope of the occupation expanded. Consequently, combat units performed military government functions directly, established security, assisted in identifying and arresting Nazis, furnished humanitarian assistance to DPs, and worked to demilitarize a militarized society. All of this was done under the shadow of social, political, and economic chaos and amidst a tremendous redeployment effort that disrupted unit integrity and consumed scarce resources. While much remained to be done after 1945, tactical units established the conditions for winning the peace in their conduct of postconflict operations. Through their efforts, the German military was disarmed, basic services were restored, the Nazi Party was destroyed, and millions of displaced persons were returned to their homelands.

The occupation of Germany was a monumental undertaking which extended over a number of years, representing a significant, long-term commitment of its military forces by the United States government. Nearly forty-five years later, the United States conducted a much smaller operation to liberate Panama. While the

objectives for the peace were equally grand, the mission initially assigned American military forces was decidedly more limited.

III. Just Cause/Promote Liberty and the American Liberation of Panama

In December 1989, U.S. military forces successfully conducted a coup d'etat to overwhelm and neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) in order to overthrow the dictatorship of General Manuel Noriega, bring him to justice in the United States, and install the legitimately elected Endara government. By the end of the first day of the invasion, the principal units of the PDF were largely destroyed or dispersed, Noriega had fled and was unable to rally any resistance, and Guillermo Endara had become the Panamanian president. Just Cause had worked according to plan.

Ironically, the staggering success of the combat phase of operations exposed the glaring weakness of both the new Panamanian government and Promote Liberty, the postconflict plan for civil military operations to restore democracy in Panama. As the combat forces completed the destruction of the PDF, the country's two largest cities, Colón and Panama City, exploded in a frenzy of looting and vandalism. Anarchy prevailed in the streets as thugs, criminals, agitators, and the poor ransacked grocery stores, luxury shops, pharmacies, and government offices.⁷⁴ Neither the U.S. nor Panama were prepared to create the conditions for a return of democracy to the country beyond the attainment of the initial military objectives of Just Cause. Tactical forces had to restore law and order and conduct basic civil-military operations in the postconflict stage to establish the necessary conditions for Promote Liberty to succeed. The "war" may have been won, but it was clear that peace had not.

Security Operations

The first priority for U.S. troops in postconflict operations was to restore stability in the country. The destruction of the PDF allowed the inauguration of a democratically elected Panamanian government, but as one scholar pointed out, a president and two vice presidents do not a government make.⁷⁵ The PDF had insinuated itself into virtually every important institution in the country, corrupting, subverting, manipulating them to its own ends.

Therefore, the PDF's sudden demise meant that there was no government for Endara, Arias Calderon and Ford to take over. Police functions had ceased. Ministry office buildings were vacant and ransacked.⁷⁶ The virtual collapse of public order in the wake of the invasion illuminated the Endara government's impotence. As John Fishel observed: "The massive looting was *prima facie* evidence that the Endara Government was merely a facade and that neither it nor the United States were prepared to provide that security."⁷⁷

With U.S. policy inextricably tied to Endara's success, the U.S. Army troops who had vanquished the PDF represented the only available resource to salvage the peace.

U.S. forces initially remained aloof from the looting which began 20 December. Combat operations had largely been confined to the periphery of Colón and Panama City where the major garrisons of the PDF were located. The JTF South plan for Just Cause had stated the intent to make "every effort...to minimize commitments of U.S. assets to support CA operations... by...avoiding maneuver, basing, and/or combat actions in built-up or densely populated areas, wherever possible."⁷⁸ Despite this reluctance, by 23 December

American troops began to move in to secure Colón and Panama City. In the former city, five rifle companies patrolled the streets and enforced an 1830 to 0630 curfew. One participant recalled: "We became the only source of order in a lawless town."⁷⁹ There were a few instances of sniping which preserved an air of danger for the soldiers, but for the most part the patrols became routine. "For the time being we inherited the chore of maintaining the peace, searching out PDF and Dignity Battalion members, arresting drunkards, stopping looters, and settling domestic disputes," one participant remembered.⁸⁰

In Panama City, the situation was much the same. Soldiers enforced population control measures and conducted twenty-four hour patrols (in effect, "walking a beat"). Troops guarded seventy-four sites around town--embassies, banks, water plants, electric facilities, radio and television stations, grocery stores, and warehouses.⁸¹ JTF South assigned the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne, the 193d Infantry Brigade, and later the 9th Infantry Regiment sectors in the city. These units canvassed their area, seeking information on arms caches and PDF activity. They brought a sense of security and calm.⁸²

Another security concern was the large number of weapons that Noriega had imported to arm his Dignity Battalions, a militia of sorts. The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) worried that these organizations might join with fugitive PDF officers to conduct a guerrilla war in Panama. The key to halting this threat was to find the weapons caches that Noriega had dispersed throughout the country. As intelligence flooded in reporting these sites, U.S.

soldiers conducted raids to seize the arms. Later, in an effort to get more of these weapons, SOUTHCOM initiated a gun buy-back program. Between these two efforts, U.S. forces gathered up over 50,000 weapons in six weeks.⁸³

In large measure, the tactical troops were very successful in creating a stable secure environment to continue postconflict operations. They rapidly restored order in the streets and deprived any nascent subversive movement of arms. While there have been several terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and property in Panama since Just Cause, no organized resistance movement has emerged to threaten stability.⁸⁴

Civil Affairs Operations

Once order was restored, the second major task that awaited tactical units was a wide-range of civil affairs operations. This had not been fully anticipated by military commanders and planners. Just as the success of Just Cause had exposed the powerlessness of the Endara Government, it also exposed a serious gap in U.S. planning and preparations to conduct postconflict operations. Instead of creating a single plan which encompassed both combat and postconflict operations, separate plans had developed in two staff sections of SOUTHCOM: the J3 and the J5. This was not a problem initially because both coordinated their efforts and because the commander in chief (CINC), General Fred F. Woerner, clearly understood the linkages. Under his guidance, the two plans, Blue Spoon (combat) and Blind Logic (civil military operations) were formulated in such a manner as to be executable "independently, concurrently, or sequentially." He envisioned a thirty day period

when the CINC would act as the military governor of Panama before turning matters over to a civilian government. During that time, he hoped to lay the foundation for a smooth transition from war to peace.⁸⁵

Several events intervened to undermine effective implementation of Blind Logic (later renamed Promote Liberty). First, JCS designated XVIII Corps the JTF headquarters to conduct the invasion instead of U.S. Army South (USARSO). Corps planners immediately began to rework Blue Spoon into Just Cause. In the process, the plan became decoupled from Blind Logic.⁸⁶ The second event was Woerner's replacement by General Maxwell Thurman. Thurman's self-avowed focus was on the combat phase of operations. He recalled: "I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC in August." In retrospect, he judged that in putting together the campaign plan, "We...probably did not spend enough time on the restoration."⁸⁷

The final event was the decision by the president not to initiate a call-up of reserve civil affairs units to conduct civil military operations in the postconflict phase. Instead, the JCS authorized twenty-five volunteer reserve civil affairs officers to come on active duty for one hundred thirty-nine days, augmented later by one hundred eighteen other special forces reservists.⁸⁸ The first of these reservists did not arrive until 26 December, several days after significant resistance had ended. The only civil affairs (CA) forces on the ground for the first weeks of Just Cause/Promote Liberty were elements of the 96th CA Battalion which had deployed with combat units from Fort Bragg. This unit was immediately

committed to establish a camp for Panamanians displaced by the fighting and a related fire which destroyed a poor neighborhood in Panama City. Initially, they used a U.S. dependent school to house 1,800 displaced persons, then later erected a tent city on the grounds to house five hundred more.⁸⁹ Meanwhile, the J-5 section of SOUTHCOM and the small remaining staff at the U.S. embassy worked to establish a functioning Panamanian government.⁹⁰

In the midst of fighting and looting, with a skeletal governmental structure at best in place, the Panamanian people desperately needed help. In the absence of sufficient military civil affairs resources or a viable civilian alternative, combat units again were pressed into service. Civil affairs operations⁹¹ began concurrently with patrolling, as soldiers moved out into the neighborhoods of Panama City and Colón, encountering the people, seeing the squalor and poverty, responding to needs. Major General James Johnson, commander of the 82d Airborne Division, admitted that he "had not expected his troops to be so deeply involved in the peacekeeping mission, but there was much ground to cover and not enough civil affairs personnel or military police."⁹²

In Colón, soldiers were given a "civil affairs checklist" as a mechanism to report the condition of municipal works and services. The executive officer of a company in the 82d Airborne recalled: "We were to report on a region's sewage system, electricity, water and food supply, medical coverage, fire-fighting capability, garbage disposal, and a whole array of systems that make civilization possible." He added: "Whenever possible, we assisted in re-establishing these systems."⁹³ 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division

improvised a system to track and assess the status of the communities in its area of operations by looking at such things as "sanitation; medicine; mail; grocery stores; media; banks and businesses," level of PDF activity, and drug trafficking.⁹⁴

U.S. troops also found themselves distributing food to the poor and running neighborhood medical aid stations. The 7th Infantry Division reported treating 7,000 Panamanians at street clinics.⁹⁵ SOUTHCOM organized a concerted effort by the army to restock Panamanian hospitals with necessary medicines, bandages, and other medical supplies.⁹⁶ Concerns about public health and sanitation arising from the release of raw sewage into the streets also led U.S. Army engineers to repair Colón's three sewage pumping stations which had been broken for five years.

As American soldiers fanned out into the Panamanian countryside, the breakdown of authority was even more apparent. One brigade commander stated that during this phase Just Cause "became a company commanders' war."⁹⁷ It may have actually become a "squad leaders' war," as the troops dispersed to conduct "a variety of missions they had never dreamed of in training, from doling out money for weapons to picking up trash. Combat skills became less critical than 'just pretty much common sense.'"⁹⁸ The PDF garrisons and pro-Noriega mayors had often fled or blended into the population. In Penonome, the commander of an infantry company, expecting to conduct combat operations, instead became the de facto mayor of the city until the Panamanian government could find a suitable local replacement.⁹⁹ U.S. troops were also pressed into service in the psychological operations campaign to buttress the

Endara government. In Colón, 82d Airborne soldiers put up posters boosting the new regime during patrols.¹⁰⁰

Perhaps the most important civil affairs project undertaken was the creation of a viable Panamanian police force to assume responsibility for law and order. At the national level, the Endara government, aided by SOUTHCOM, established the Panamanian National Police (PNP). At the local level, tactical commanders often improvised their own solutions. In Colón, the 7th Infantry Division's assistant provost marshal phoned home to get a wiring diagram of the Columbus, Ohio police department to use for forming a new municipal police force at the direction of the commander of TF Atlantic.¹⁰¹ As these local police forces and the PNP became operational, American authorization to conduct searches and make arrests gradually declined. Instead, U.S. soldiers and M.P.'s conducted joint patrols with the Panamanians. This served as a mechanism to provide informal on-the-job training and establish standards of behavior to maintain public confidence that had been engendered by the presence of American troops. It was an important expedient until the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program of the U.S. Justice Department could assume the task of training a professional police force in Panama.¹⁰²

Summary

In February 1990, the last of the invasion troops departed Panama, less than two months after Just Cause began. By that time, Promote Liberty had finally become organized. The key event was General Thurman's decision to create a Military Support Group (MSG) in the U.S. Embassy to direct Promote Liberty under the guidance of

the Ambassador. Special Operations Command supported the effort with personnel and resources, including a steady flow of Special Forces and Civil Affairs reservists to conduct field operations. The commander and deputy commander of the MSG established an extremely close working relationship with President Endara and he sought their advice and assistance on matters ranging from police uniforms to reopening schools.¹⁰³ In addition to the efforts of the MSG, SOUTHCOM deployed National Guard engineer units from the United States to restore or improve the Panama's infrastructure.¹⁰⁴ Promote Liberty came to an end when the MSG disbanded one year after the invasion.

Whether the U.S. "won the peace" in Panama is still being debated. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal concluded that the "Invasion of Panama Shows Limited Results," noting that after nearly five years, corruption and drug trafficking were still prevalent in Panama.¹⁰⁵ The continuation of these problems, however, is symptomatic of nothing more than the long-term strategic challenge of Panama. Many other ills plague the society including deep socio-economic divisions, dependence on U.S. assistance, crime, poverty, and a hundred other third world malaises. However, this litany of problems ignores the new beginning created by Just Cause and Promote Liberty. A democratic government sits in power in place of a military dictator. The pervasive influence of the PDF in all aspects of society was destroyed. Stability was restored to daily life in Panama. U.S. combat forces accomplished all of this through both conflict and postconflict operations. In addition to toppling Noriega and

neutralizing the PDF, U.S. soldiers reestablished law and order in Panama's streets, distributed food to the hungry, provided medical aid to the civilian population, administered localities until the Endara government established its authority, assisted in the clean-up of cities, and secured and restored essential services. Combat forces provided a bridge between war and peace. By giving the Endara government time to organize and stabilizing the situation to allow a U.S. ambassador to assume civilian control of the assistance effort, successful postconflict operations created the conditions under which the Panamanian and U.S. governments could successfully "wage peace."

IV. Winning the Peace: Reflections on Experiences in Germany and Panama

The experiences of the U.S. Army in conducting postconflict operations in Germany in 1944-1945 and in Panama in 1989-1990 do not offer an unvarying picture of the nature of postconflict operations. There was clearly an immense difference in the scale of these two events, whether measured by the number of personnel involved, the magnitude of tasks, or the cost of the effort. There were also significant differences in planning the transition from war to peace and in the nature of the desired U.S. role in the postwar government.

The occupation of Germany was the climax of a long, arduous, bloody war which approached Clausewitz' vision of absolute war. U.S. strategic and operational planners prepared a postconflict operations plan, ECLIPSE and created and deployed an extensive military government structure to aid commanders in the transition from war to peace. No one questioned the U.S. intent to conduct a belligerent occupation of its zone of Germany to ensure that the conditions which had given rise to two world wars did not recur. The United States set out to deliberately extirpate Nazism from Germany and impose a cleansed government in its place. One area of disagreement at the highest strategic levels was who would be responsible for this occupation. Eisenhower and Marshall accepted the need for the army to initially take charge of the operation, but they were anxious to rapidly turn over responsibility to the State Department. This did not, in fact occur until 1949.¹⁰⁶

In contrast with the American experience in the occupation of Germany, the liberation of Panama by the U.S. military involved a very short campaign to simultaneously apply overwhelming force against key points to achieve the designated military objectives with minimal casualties. Commanders anticipated executing the mission rapidly and leaving. Thorough planning for the invasion was evident. So too was the lack of coordination and planning for postconflict operations. Instead, a plan for civil military operations to "restore" Panama was hurriedly pulled off the shelf, adjusted, and applied with insufficient coordination (military or interagency) or resources (especially civil affairs personnel). When large-scale looting threatened stability and undermined confidence in the new Panamanian government, U.S. tactical forces intervened and became directly involved in postconflict operations. The United States, sensitive to charges of colonialism and imperialism, especially in Latin America, was extremely anxious to avoid even the appearance of occupying Panama, and thus rushed to inaugurate Endara within hours of the invasion.

Comparison of experiences with postconflict operations in Germany and Panama yield not only contrasts, but similarities. These similarities represent useful considerations for formulating plans, doctrine, and training programs to make the transition from war to peace. A fundamental lesson which may be drawn from the case studies is the regularity of tasks which compose postconflict operations. For the soldiers involved, it mattered little whether they were an occupation or liberation force, the missions tended to be the same--establish security, restore order, revive essential

services, prepare for redeployment, and provide humanitarian assistance. In accomplishing these tasks, they established a stable foundation upon which national policy objectives for the peace might be constructed.

Another important consideration for formulating plans, doctrine and training programs is that combat operations and postconflict operations are likely to be concurrent, not sequential. The Army's natural fixation on warfighting can lead to a plan which segregates rather than integrates the two operations. General Thurman addressed this tendency when reflecting on Just Cause:

The warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed to post-conflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment. If I had been the XVIII Corps commander, I might have very well said Blind Logic is going to be residual....My task is to conduct the strike force operation and get out. I think the proclivity was to leave the fighting to the warfighter and the restoration to the people who were in country.¹⁰⁷

Similarly, Earl Ziemke concluded from his study of the occupation of Germany that "an occupation has residual characteristics of the combat operation and that the occupation is as much the final stage of the war as it is the assumption of the victor's rights and powers."¹⁰⁸ Thus the war plan should address the transition from war to peace while recognizing that clear delineations between the two are unlikely.

For military planners, another consideration for postconflict operations which emerges from the experiences gained in Germany and Panama is the need to provide for a transfer of responsibility

from tactical commanders to those charged with winning the peace. While combat operations are on-going, tactical commanders clearly must be preeminent. Once active resistance has ended, however, priority of effort should be shifted. In Germany, efforts to establish working military governments to administer the peace were hampered by wartime command structures. Initially, the continuation of this organization was understandable: relations were established, procedures were understood, the threat environment was unclear, and the tactical mission to prepare forces for redeployment to the Pacific was pressing. The retention of wartime command relationships also reflected considerations of power and prestige. General Lucius Clay asserted that "The tactical troops did not want to give up, because as long as they were in charge they could commandeer houses, and whatever they wanted, and they like that sense of power."¹⁰⁹ As a consequence, the Germans, a people accustomed to clear lines of authority, were confused as to whether the local commander of the military detachment or the nearest tactical commander in whose area of operations it fell was in charge. For example, in Amberg, a German delegation requested the military government "not to issue any more orders without clearing them" with the nearby 4th Armored Division: they were weary of dealing with contradictory instructions from the Americans.

In Panama, the problem was different in that the U.S. had no intention of establishing military governments. Instead, the plan assumed that there would be a functioning Panamanian government. Problems arose when this did not immediately occur; there was no

alternative U.S. civilian or military entity available to execute contingency plans except the combat forces which had vanquished the PDF. These soldiers were pressed into service as temporary mayors, policemen, garbagemen, and social workers. Planning for postconflict operations should address this transition fully.

Experience in both Germany and Panama also makes it clear that combat units should be prepared to conduct a full range of civil military operations, either concurrently with their primary duties, or sequentially with the end of active resistance. Both in Germany, where a robust civil affairs structure existed, and in Panama, where it did not, tactical units found themselves performing missions that had nothing to do with their military occupational specialities. This sometimes led to confusion and frustration. One lieutenant in Panama reflecting on the change of mission from combat to postconflict operations, realized that "We were still needed, but not in a way readily apparent to an infantryman. We were more like social workers, evaluating and providing assistance to the local population. Not that there was anything wrong with this role. The problem lay in the speed of our transition from the battlefield."¹¹⁰

A final consideration for conduct of postconflict operations is that with the end of active combat, there will be immediate political and military pressures for redeployment of combat troops, either to other theaters or home. Planning for postconflict operations should take into account this imperative and recognize the conflicting priorities which are likely to emerge. It will still be necessary to win the peace, but it may be necessary to do so in an atmosphere of personnel turbulence and strained logistics.

The mechanism the Army has for collecting and transmitting the lessons gained from such experiences as the occupation of Germany and liberation is its doctrine. Doctrine, according to FM 100-5, Operations, is designed to capture the "collective wisdom gained through recent conduct of operations--combat as well as operations other than war--numerous exercises, and the deliberate process of informed reasoning throughout the Army."¹¹¹ The Army's doctrine tells its soldiers how it expects to fight wars. Does it also tell them how to make the transition from war to peace?

V. U.S. Army Doctrine and Tactical Considerations for Postconflict Operations

Prior to the 1993 publication of a new edition of FM 100-5, Army doctrine concerning postconflict operations was limited to Special Operating Forces (SOF) field manuals, largely because Army SOF has responsibility for conducting civil affairs and psychological operations. As one would expect, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, presents the most detailed discussion.¹¹² It establishes doctrine for Civil Affairs (CA) units to employ in conducting CA operations. However, the tenets, missions, and planning considerations are relevant to any type of unit conducting postconflict operations. FM 41-10 assigns CA units two basic types of missions, little changed from the World War II distinction between civil affairs and military government, but now called civil military operations and civil administration. The former provides civil affairs support to tactical commanders to assist them in conducting military operations by minimizing civilian interference, obtaining local resources, and protecting public health. The latter provides government services to friendly territory when requested, or to occupied territory when directed. There is another civil administration function termed "civil assistance" which describes efforts by tactical commanders to provide essential services, maintain order, and control critical resources in their area of operations.¹¹³ This provision alone makes the doctrine in FM 41-10 directly applicable to a wider population of the Army than just Civil Affairs units.

For the Army as a whole, doctrinal neglect of postconflict operations ended with the publication of the 1993 edition of FM 100-5. This manual directly addresses war termination and postconflict operations as a stage of force projection operations, along with pre-deployment, deployment, entry operations, operations, redeployment and reconstitution, and demobilization.¹¹⁴ While FM 100-5 does not offer an explicit definition of postconflict operations, it defines the purpose of such operations as being to provide a "continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve the overall strategic aims."¹¹⁵ Thus it recognizes the importance of winning the peace. FM 100-5 asserts that postconflict operations begin "when a cessation of hostilities or a truce is called." It adds the important proviso, however, that "this transition can occur even as residual combat operations are still underway in parts of the theater of operations."¹¹⁶ This realization reflects an awareness of the concurrent nature of postconflict operations with combat.

FM 100-5 also asserts that the U.S. Army is uniquely qualified to conduct postconflict operations because it alone has "the skills and staying power to control prisoners, handle refugees, mark mine fields and destroy unexploded ordnance, provide emergency health service support, provide emergency restoration of utilities and other civil affairs, and perform other required humanitarian assistance activities."¹¹⁷ Other services, notably the Marine Corps, have some of these same capabilities, but they lack the logistics infrastructure needed to adequately support sustained postconflict operations. The list of postconflict missions presented in this

assertion of capability is also important because it lays out the tasks which comprise postconflict operations. In comparison with the experiences gained in Panama and Germany, the only major task omitted is restoration of order.

Perhaps the most important contribution FM 100-5 makes to the discussion of the transition from war to peace is its recognition that "Postconflict operations make demands at every level of command."¹¹⁸ Because FM 100-5 is the "keystone" document in the U.S. Army's doctrinal arch, all other doctrine must be compatible with the philosophy and missions it presents. However, current doctrine for corps operations (FM 100-15), division operations (FM 71-100), brigade operations (FM 71-3), battalion operations (FM 71-2), and company operations (FM 71-1) are still based on the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 which, focusing exclusively on warfighting, failed to address postconflict operations.

However, the initial draft revisions of FM 100-15 and FM 71-100 do respond to the postconflict mission identified by the current FM 100-5. The initial draft of FM 100-15, Corps Operations, echoes FM 100-5 by dealing with war termination and postconflict operations as a stage in force projection operations, observing that "when hostilities cease or a truce goes into effect, corps units transition to a period of postconflict operations."¹¹⁹ However, the objective identified by FM 100-15 is "the smooth transition of responsibility back to civil authorities."¹²⁰ This misses the true objective of postconflict operations: assisting in the attainment of the strategic aim for which the war was fought.

FM 100-15 also provides a list of missions involved in planning the corps' conduct of postconflict operations. These include provisions for restoration of order; reestablishment of infrastructure; force protection; unit repositioning; enemy prisoners of war control; refugee assistance; health services; humanitarian relief operations; and movement of people and equipment preparatory to redeployment.¹²¹ This tabulation closely reflects the missions associated with postconflict operations in Germany and Panama.

The initial draft of FM 71-100, Division Operations, reflects Army and corps (draft) doctrine by including postconflict as a stage of force projection operations. It provides a definition which differs from the other manuals, however: "Both war termination and postconflict operations are those activities taken to *restore conditions* [emphasis added] in the area of operations favorable to U.S. national policy." In introducing this notion of "restoration," FM 71-100 errs. As the experiences in Germany and Panama illustrate, postconflict operations often are designed to create wholly new conditions, not restore the old.

FM 71-100 does better in strongly conveying that postconflict operations are concurrent with combat operations: "As hostilities terminate *in parts of the area of operations* [emphasis added], units occupying those areas may reorganize and begin to transition to preplanned postconflict activities."¹²² This recognition, completely consistent with the experiences of Germany and Panama, is much more clearly expressed than in FMs 100-5 and 100-15.

FM 71-100 also identifies the postconflict missions the division may expect to conduct, including force protection and stabilization of its assigned area by: "controlling indigenous, enemy, and friendly personnel in and around the unit locations;" securing EPW; assisting Civil Affairs; retraining units; restoring order; protecting property; and reestablishing local infrastructure.¹²³ The one significant omission from this list of mission is performing civil assistance. As demonstrated in both Panama and Germany, there may be no Civil Affairs units available to provide assistance: CA missions may have to be performed using the division's organic assets.¹²⁴

In addition to doctrine, the Army also publishes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) which develop, expand, and explicate doctrine. FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, published in August 1993, comprehensively addresses postconflict operations. This TTP recognizes that the purpose of postconflict operations "is not only to return to an environment of peace as expeditiously as possible, but also to increase the probability of sustained peace."¹²⁵ It also appreciates the concurrent nature of war and peace: "The division may simultaneously conduct peacetime activities and search and attack missions (that is, mop-up of enemy resistance and search for caches)."¹²⁶

FM 71-100-2 addresses the specific tasks that may comprise postconflict operations more fully than FM 71-100. The TTP anticipates that "Under the guidance of the Department of State and the JTF, Army forces may be directed to help reinforce or

reestablish formal institutions eliminated during combat operations and ameliorate negative postcombat popular attitudes toward the U.S."¹²⁷ FM 71-100-2 distinguishes three separate groups of associated activities. The first group is performed by supporting civil affairs units in the division area of operations. These include identifying and procuring available local resources which might assist division operations; acting as liaison with U.S. governmental agencies, the host nation, and/or international organizations; and, on order, establishing a temporary civil administration to maintain law and order and provide essential public services until the host nation can assume responsibility. These are essentially the tasks described in greater detail in FM 41-10.

The second group of tasks belongs to the combat brigades of the division, and include assisting in establishing and maintaining law and order; providing force protection; making contact with a rural, isolated populace; assisting SOF units in psychological operations; disarming the population through arms buy-back programs; responding to threats to the host nation government at the request of the country team; training indigenous self-defense force; aiding in reconstruction; and performing humanitarian assistance. The third group consists of all the divisions combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) organizations. These units' missions presumably reflect their normal functions; the TTP does not develop them to any degree.¹²⁸ Altogether, FM 71-100-2 offers an excellent discussion of the postconflict tasks which parallels experiences in Panama and Germany.

Summary

Beginning with the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, the Army has recognized war termination and postconflict operations as a discrete stage in force projection operations. While current doctrine for corps, divisions, brigades, battalions, and companies does not yet reflect this concept, initial drafts of FM 100-15 and FM 71-100 indicate that it is being incorporated. TTPs are also expanding to include postconflict operations. The postconflict missions identified in draft corps and division doctrine, as well as FM 71-100-2, are comprehensive, and provide excellent guides for commanders to anticipate the type of tasks they can expect in the transition from war to peace. Moreover, the new doctrine recognizes the concurrent nature of combat and postconflict operations, although FM 71-100 (initial draft) makes this point most clearly.

By including postconflict operations as a stage in force projection, the Army's doctrine has begun to recognize that every war must end. It also acknowledges a role for the Army in shaping the peace. Doctrine is clearly a work in progress, however. Triggered by the publication of the new FM 100-5, the process of review and revision of all other doctrine is now underway. It remains for the resulting doctrine to be absorbed into the way the Army trains, thinks, and organizes.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The U.S. Army is preeminently an organization designed to fight and win wars. It has enjoyed spectacular success in this mission. Largely unappreciated by the warriors themselves is the role they play when wars end. During the Cold War, the Army focused on Armageddon; there was little room for anything extraneous to winning the great battle for survival against the Soviets. This led to a singular battle-focus which colored all doctrine. The end of the Cold War opened new possibilities and resurrected old missions.

The inclusion of postconflict operations in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 was one of the corrective lenses applied to the Army's warfighting myopia. The addition of an entire chapter in the same manual on operations other than war (OOTW) requires an even more radical adjustment in how the Army sees its mission. However, none of the OOTW missions cited in FM 100-5 precisely describes the tasks which must be performed during the transition from war to peace. "Peacekeeping" relates to stabilizing conflict between two belligerent nations. "Peace Enforcement" operations are designed to support "diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force." "Nation Assistance" is the OOTW mission in which military forces support "a host nation's efforts to promote development."¹²⁹ "Postconflict operations," by definition, should be considered an operations other than war.¹³⁰ However, since all OOTW missions are either pre- or

post-conflict, the term lacks precision. Accordingly, a better name for the mission is "stability operations."

Stability operations may be defined as those operations undertaken during the war termination and postconflict stage of force projection operations. During this period, the combat forces represent the vast preponderance of resources on the ground. Political mechanisms for assuming power are non-existent or lack requisite strength. In conducting stability operations, "the commander fosters conditions that permit orderly change from a combat or crisis environment to an environment that allows restoration of legitimate governments or assists an international organization that will take charge of those responsibilities as directed by the NCA."¹³¹ In recognizing a specific mission in postconflict operations, rather than viewing it as a stage in force projection, the Army could better focus training and doctrine.

Doctrine, however, is meaningless unless it is read and applied. The only effective way to ensure this is through training. General Carl Vuono, then Army Chief of Staff, wrote in the foreword to FM 25-101, "Training is the means by which the Army's quality soldiers and leaders develop their warfighting proficiency and exercise the collective capabilities they will require in conflict."¹³² This attitude now needs to be expanded to include the postconflict capabilities the soldiers will also require.

Training has commonly failed to prepare soldiers for the transition from war to peace. They have been taught how to fight, but in the postconflict stage of operations a whole new set of tasks may suddenly become, by default, part of their job description. In

Panama, an officer observed: "For the most part we were infantrymen...Then suddenly we were expected to act as diplomats and policemen....The result was often frustration, tension, and ambivalence that further complicated an already confusing state of affairs."¹³³ The Army often relies on the versatility, flexibility, and common-sense of its soldiers to accomplish missions. However, training for leaders and soldiers in the tasks they can expect to perform in the transition from war to peace would go far towards smoothing both planning and execution.

The Army's unit training system is a complicated process designed to do two things well: prioritize use of limited training time and establish specific component tasks, conditions, and standards for every mission. The mechanism for prioritizing training requirements is the unit mission essential task list (METL). Commanders compile their METL after a thorough analysis identifies those tasks which the organization must do to accomplish its assigned mission. The focus is generally on arriving at the scene of the fight, conducting it, and sustaining the effort. This ignores a key component of success in war: the peace. As LTC Thomas E. Hanlon observed: "We organize and train to win. Or do we? If winning includes conflict termination on terms favorable to long range goals and interests, then winning is not complete until political stability and public order have been achieved."¹³⁴ Commanders should recognize this fact and include conduct of postconflict operations in their METL.

Once the mission is part of the METL, it must be trained. This requires that it be broken down into component tasks, conditions,

and standards. The mechanism by which the Army identifies these is the Mission Training Plan (MTP). These documents are published for each level and type of tactical organization to ensure a basic standard of performance is consistent throughout the Army. Currently, MTPs for combat units do not address postconflict operations tasks as identified in FMs 100-5, 100-15 (initial draft), 71-100 (initial draft) and 71-100-2. Once this is done, units can effectively prepare for the mission.

Current Army doctrine establishes a foundation for planning and executing postconflict operations. Existing (and pending) doctrine appreciates the scope of tasks and missions arising in the transition from war to peace. Finally, by addressing postconflict operations in such key documents as FM 100-5, FM 100-15, and FM 71-100, the Army has sent a salutary message that winning the peace is not solely the domain of specialists in civil affairs, special forces, and military police.¹³⁵ As the occupation of Germany demonstrated, even when a robust civil affairs capability exists combat soldiers had a significant role to play in the transition from war to peace. The increasing scarcity of specialized units makes it even less likely today that they will be available soon enough in sufficient numbers to relieve combat forces from responsibility for postconflict operations.¹³⁶ The addition of "versatility" as a tenet of war involves an admission that, given the reduced size of the Army, there will not be adequate numbers of specially trained personnel to establish the conditions for peace. Just as he always has, the combat soldier will bear the initial burden of winning the peace.

¹B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 2d Revised Edition, 1967), 351.

²LTC Michael C. Griffith, "War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice," SAMS Monograph, AY 91-92, 40. This insight underlay Clausewitz's brilliant analysis: "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 99. Liddell Hart also noted that "it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire." Strategy, 366.

³For general discussion of American experiences in occupation, see Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 2; Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 3. For specific cases, see: Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969); James Wylie Gettys, Jr., "To Conquer a Peace": South Carolina and the Mexican War, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1974; James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967); and Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1962).

⁴Ziemke, Occupation, 3.

⁵For example, Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); John Gimble, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

⁶This study uses the term "postconflict operations" to denote those actions conducted by the army to achieve the strategic policy objectives for peace after the military aim has been fulfilled.

⁷According to Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare: "military occupation confers upon the invading force the means of exercising control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer sovereignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty. The exercise of these rights results from the established power of the occupant and from the necessity of maintaining law and order, indispensable to both the inhabitants and to the occupying force." Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1956), 140. The same regulation applied in 1944.

⁸In democratic elections held in May 1989, Guillermo Endara was elected president of the country, along with two vice presidents, Ricardo Arias Calderon and Billy Ford. General Noriega, the leader of the Panamanian Defense Forces, negated the results of the election and installed his own candidate to serve as president. The United States refused to recognize this government, insisting that Endara was the legitimate head of state. Within hours of the invasion, Endara, Arias Calderon, and Ford were inaugurated in a ceremony at Fort Clayton. See John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 15, 1992), 43. For a discussion of "liberation" see Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory...A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 27, 32. Von Glahn also categorizes a third type of occupation: "policing occupations, for any number of real or fictitious reasons."

⁹FM 100-5, Operations, v.

¹⁰Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture, October 3, 1973.

¹¹FM 100-5, 1-1. James Schneider, Professor of Military Strategy at the School of Advanced Military Studies, used the surprising analogy of Helen Keller to illustrate how the military prepares its soldiers for war. He asked: "How does an army take so many 'Helen Kellers' and open their eyes, ears and mouth to war?" The answer, he concluded "flows from our military doctrine which becomes the imprimatur of our professional beliefs." James J.

Schneider, "The Eye of Minerva: The Origin, Nature, and Purpose of Military Theory and Doctrine," Theoretical Paper No. 5, School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), 14-15.

¹²Von Glahn, Belligerent Occupation, 42-44.

¹³For an excellent discussion of the historiography of the occupation, see Edward N. Peterson, "The Occupation as Perceived by the Public, Scholars, and Policy Makers," in Robert Wolfe, ed., American Proconsuls, 416-424. The principal source for understanding the occupation of Germany is Earl F. Ziemke's outstanding official history in the Army Historical Series, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975). Several other official histories are useful, including Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953) and Third Army, Mission Accomplished: Third United States Army Occupation of Germany (Printed by Engineer Reproduction Plant, 1947). A number of former civil affairs/military government officers produced postwar studies. The best of these are Carl J. Freidrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1948) and Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947). The most comprehensive academic study of military government is by Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947). John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961) is a superb case study of the operation and impact of the occupation on a single community. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1950) provides some fascinating insights by the architect of the occupation.

¹⁴Ziemke, Occupation, 26; Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953), 1-2.

¹⁵Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 6.

¹⁶World War II marked a departure from previous wars in that postconflict requirements were considered. The Hunt Report, issued

in 1920 by the military governor of the occupied Rhineland, had urged the Army to "develop competence in civil administration among its officers during peacetime" before "responsibility was thrust on" them in wartime. In 1940, the Judge Advocate General's office produced FM 27-5, Military Government, the first such doctrine in U.S. Army history. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall created the G-5 Section of the General Staff to conduct civil affairs planning. SHAEF formed the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) in February 1944 with three provisional regiments of ten companies each. Two of the regiments were earmarked to work in Germany, the other in France and the Low Countries. The companies were divided into detachments of various sizes which were assigned to support army, corps, and division operations. Merle Fainsod, "The Development of American Military Government Policy during World War II," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1948), 23-41; Holborn, American Military Government, 7-10; Ziemke, , 3, 69-70.

¹⁷Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 6.

¹⁸These were called "H" or "I" detachments. They "advanced with the front line troops posting proclamations, removing Nazi officials, and replacing them with non-Nazis, frequently in six or seven localities a day." Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Robert Wolfe, ed., American Proconsuls, 56. See Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), 58-59 for a discussion of the organization of civil affairs detachments.

¹⁹Zink, Military Government, 40, 170-172; John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 37, 68. Language limitations forced the military government detachments to work with Germans who spoke English or through interpreters: either of these sources could have their own agendas. Even if the American officers spoke German, it would have been difficult to separate out the sycophants, opportunists, and self-promoters. Many Americans turned to German clergymen for assistance, assuming them to be neutral. This was not the German tradition, where the church was bound to the state, receiving tax revenues for their support. This

resulted in a number of appointments which later had to be rescinded.

²⁰Ziemke, Occupation, 194, 236.

²¹Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (New York: Knopf, 1959), 49.

²²Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 10.

²³The military government detachment (an "E" type) sent to Aachen in October 1944, for example, consisted of thirty-five officers and forty-eight enlisted men. Ziemke, Occupation, 144-146.

²⁴Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 9.

²⁵Ziemke, Occupation, 243.

²⁶A total of 7,799 officers and men were assigned by table of organization and equipment to the European Civil Affairs Division. Ibid., 68. According to FM 27-5, Military Government (1943 edition), the primary function of military government was to support tactical operations "by maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing local resources in aid of military objectives and carrying out governmental policies." Carl J. Friedrich, "Military Government and Democratization: A Central Issue of American Foreign Policy," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1948), 12. The 1943 edition of FM 27-5 had superseded the original 1940 version which critics believed insufficiently emphasized the subordination of military government efforts to tactical considerations. The 1943 version stated: "The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government." The 1940 edition had also emphasized providing for the needs of enemy populations. The 1943 edition omitted this provision unless it could be justified in terms of the benefits accruing to the occupying force. This change in emphasis was critical because it reflected a perspective which saw military government "primarily in terms of the requirements of the combat

phase." As a result, the doctrine failed to adequately anticipate and address post-combat problems of transition to military government. Fainsod, "The Development of American Military Government Policy During World War II," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1948), 31.

²⁷While adoption of historical state and provincial boundaries (Land, would have significantly eased the task of politically rebuilding Germany for military government detachments, tactical areas of operation defined administrative responsibility instead until well after V-E Day. A tactical orientation continued until 1 January 1946, because the commanders of Third and Seventh Armies initially were dual-hatted as Military Governors of the Eastern and Western Military Districts respectively. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 30.

²⁸Ibid., 31.

²⁹Ziemke, Occupation, 273.

³⁰Ibid., 335.

³¹An invasion of the home islands seemed certain, and Patton and others anticipated large-scale operations on the Chinese mainland as well. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 696.

³²Ziemke, Occupation, 328. One example of the rapidity with which this effort was launched was that on 13 May 1945, Third Army began moving units to Le Havre. Third Army, Mission Accomplished: Third United States Army Occupation of Germany (Printed by Engineer Reproduction Plant, 1947), 15.

³³This process was based on a complicated point system determined by length of service, time overseas, combat experience, and parental status. See Ziemke, 328-329 for a discussion of the point system. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 46-47, provides a graph of redeployment by category and month.

³⁴Zeimke, Occupation, 306.

³⁵Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 49.

³⁶Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 16.

³⁷Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 73-75.

³⁸This represented but a portion of the "unprecedented mass migration of civilians and soldiers" which was taking place in Europe. In addition to seven million DPs throughout Germany, there were twelve to fourteen million refugees fleeing from eastern Germany, along with millions of German soldiers, who were seeking to avoid capture by the Russians. See Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1992), 2-6, for an excellent discussion of this situation.

³⁹General Hobart Gay, Third Army Chief of Staff, captured this concern in his journal on 10 April 1945, writing: "The situation reference displaced persons continues to be aggravated....Most of them are like animals, or worse, and unless force can be used on them to insure reasonable sanitary measures, it would appear that disease, perhaps something bordering on a plague, is in the offing." Blumenson, Patton Papers, 682. Among other actions consequently taken, 12th Army Group established and manned a "*cordon sanitaire* on the Rhine" to dust DPs with DDT as they left Germany. Ziemke, Occupation, 195, 286.

⁴⁰"Their duties consisted of mobilizing resources, collecting and assembling DPs and ex-prisoners of war, registering them, segregating them into national groups, providing shelter and clothing, feeding them, and preserving their health." Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 10.

⁴¹The Ninth Army eventually dedicated an entire corps to assisting DPs. *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴²Ziemke, Occupation, 236-237, 252.

⁴³SHAEF was responsible "for the care of displaced persons, including the furnishing of food, clothing, shelter, and the supplies necessary to maintain health and sanitation for camps, maintenance of security and provision of communications facilities." This responsibility was delegated to tactical units in the field. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 73.

⁴⁴Ziemke, Occupation, 286. The care of DPs became a long-term problem for the United States with the onset of the Cold War. Many Poles and other eastern Europeans were termed "non-repatriable" when their right to refuse repatriation to their Soviet-dominated homelands was upheld by U.S. policymakers. In 1947, there were still several hundred thousand living in UNRRA camps. Many were employed as guards and in labor units doing reconstruction work. See Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 54, 75-77; Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 36-38.

⁴⁵Ziemke, Occupation, 286-289. One issue which arose concerned the thousands of Russians captured wearing German uniforms. The Soviets insisted that these "citizens" be repatriated whether they wanted to be or not.

⁴⁶Ziemke, Occupation, 61, 205. In Marburg, "Displaced persons continued to loot after military government arrived, because German police lacked jurisdiction over them and because some local unit commanders apparently sanctioned it. Military authorities stepped in only after the displaced persons began to threaten the security of the local area by robberies and murders. They stopped looting by putting the displaced persons into camps where they could be observed, controlled, and then processed for repatriation." Gimbel, Marburg, 37, 61.

⁴⁷Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 37.

⁴⁸Between 27-31 May, 55,000 DPs passed through this single point. Ziemke, Occupation, 286.

⁴⁹Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 75.

⁵⁰Bischof and Ambrose, Eisenhower and the German POWs, 9.

⁵¹James Bacque, a Canadian novelist, charged in 1989 that he had uncovered evidence of a concerted effort by the U.S. Army at the express direction of General Dwight D. Eisenhower to systematically starve German prisoners of war in 1945. As a result, up to a million died in U.S. "death camps" in Germany. These allegations stirred great controversy at the time and resulted in a conference at the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans in 1990. A panel of historians examined the charges and concluded that Bacque "reaches conclusions and makes charges that are demonstrably

absurd." The published findings of this conference effectively refuted Bacque's thesis and methodology. James Bacque, Other Losses: The Shocking Truth Behind the Mass Deaths of Disarmed German Soldiers and Civilians Under General Eisenhower's Command (Toronto: Stoddert, 1989). Bischof and Ambrose, Eisenhower and the German POWs.

⁵²Ziemke, Occupation, 241-243.

⁵³Seven million rations were required daily in Germany to feed U.S. soldiers and PWs: this rate of consumption could not be supported. SHAEF cut rations for Allied personnel by ten percent. It also authorized a distinction between "prisoners of war" who had surrendered prior to V-E Day and "disarmed" German military forces who had surrendered after 9 May. This allowed the circumvention of the Geneva Convention requirement that PWs receive the same rations as their captors; disarmed Germans were given less. Ziemke, Occupation, 293; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 89.

⁵⁴Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 89.

⁵⁵Ziemke, Occupation, 293.

⁵⁶For example, the 318th Infantry Regiment, 80th Division ran a discharge center which processed 8,500 German PWs a day. CCA of the 12th Armored Division dedicated five truck companies to moving discharged PWs. Ziemke, Occupation, 294; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 90.

⁵⁷This was done under the "labor reparation policy" whereby the Allies determined to use German labor to assist in rebuilding devastated areas of Europe. See Brian Loring Villa, "The Diplomatic and Political Context of the POW Camps Tragedy," in Bischof and Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower and the German POWs, 69; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 53; Ziemke, Occupation, 294.

⁵⁸Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 60-61.

⁵⁹Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 86. According to the Third Army history of the occupation, "Large quantities of explosives were crated and dispatched to the port of Bremerhaven where they were disposed on by being dumped into the sea while other shipments of ammunition were distributed among Allied

Nations as a form of reparation." Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 61.

⁶⁰Julian Bach, Jr., America's Germany: An Account of the Occupation (New York: Random House, 1946), 41; Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 61-62.

⁶¹Stephen E. Ambrose, "Eisenhower and the Germans," in Bischof and Ambrose, eds, Eisenhower and the German POWs, 35.

⁶²Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps (New York: Franklin Watts, 1989), 225.

⁶³Ziemke observed: "Competent non-Nazis were among the rarest commodities everywhere in Germany...; in the managerial and professional groups they were practically nonexistent." Ziemke, Occupation, 182.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 151. Candidates were vetted against Black-White-Grey lists prepared by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and investigated by CIC agents. See also Zink, Military Government, 170, and William B. Dallas, "The Role of Counterintelligence in the European Theater of Operations during World War II," Master of Military Arts Thesis (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1993), 75.

⁶⁵Military government detachments administered a questionnaire (the *Fragebogen*) to all Germans seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces. Effectively, this amounted to the entire adult population of the American zone, or some thirteen million Germans, creating an immense administrative burden. The chief historian of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany observed: "the assignment of going over the thirteen million completed forms, investigating the validity of the data furnished, and deciding on the action to be taken in each individual case was positively overwhelming." Zink, Military Government, 159. Soldiers were transferred from other duties and assigned to assist the military government detachments. Even with these augmentees, little headway could be made in reducing the backlog. Ultimately, 1.65 million *Fragebogen* were screened before General Lucius Clay, the Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, succeeded in passing responsibility for this task to newly constituted German courts. Of

the 1.65 million questionnaires screened, U.S. officials had judged 300,000 to be Nazis, eligible only for employment as common labor. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1950), 69.

⁶⁶Military Government Law Number 8, effective in September 1945, "made it mandatory to dismiss anyone who had ever been a member of the Nazi party for whatever reason from any position save one of ordinary labor." Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (New York: Knopf, 1959), 130. Patton's well-documented clashes with Eisenhower on this issue resulted in his removal from command of Third Army in October 1945. Patton recorded in his diary on 29 September 1945 the result of a meeting with Eisenhower in which they discussed the presence of Nazis in the government of Bavaria: "So I called Harkins at 6.30 and told him to remove Schaeffer, Lange, and Rattenhuber and all members of their ministries in any way tainted with Nazism regardless of the setback it would give to the administration of Bavaria and the resultant cold and hunger it would produce--not only for the Germans but also for the DP's. This seemed to make everyone happy except myself." Quoted in Blumenson, Patton Papers, 785.

⁶⁷The area that a division might be asked to cover could be extensive: the 78th Infantry Division was assigned an area of 3,600 square miles, the 70th Infantry Division one of 2,500 square miles. Ziemke, Occupation, 320.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 320.

⁶⁹U.S. forces performed various other special security functions. The 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division guarded the prisoners and proceedings at the Nuremburg Trials for twelve months. Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 25. A tank battalion and infantry regiment were detailed to guard a huge treasure trove found in a mine near Merkers. Ziemke, Occupation, 229.

⁷⁰See Sayer and Botting, Secret Army, 233; Carl J. Friedrich, "The Three Phases of Field Operations in Germany, 1945-1946," in Friedrich, ed., American Experiences, 244; Ib Melchior, Case By Case: A U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent in World War II (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993), 135-153, describes the capture of one Werewolf cell.

⁷¹Sayer and Botting, Secret Army, 296; Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 28; Gimbel, Marburg, 49.

⁷²Davidson, Death and Life, 50.

⁷³Third Army, Mission Accomplished, 52-53.

⁷⁴Altogether, the Panamanian economy sustained an estimated one to two billion dollars in losses, this to an economy already suffering from two years of economic embargo by the United States. Fishel, Fog of Peace, 29.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 33. John T. Fishel is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. During Just Cause/Promote Liberty he served on active duty in the SOUTHCOM J-5 Directorate as Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division.

⁷⁶General Thurman, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, was surprised at this turn of events: "We expected that most of the people in the civil service would report to their offices and take charge of all government property, provided they had been anti-Noriega. Unfortunately, many of the people in the various cabinet offices were Noriega cronies. Subsequently, those offices were looted in retribution, just like the stores." Quoted in Richard H. Schultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1993), 28.

⁷⁷Fishel, Fog of Peace, 29.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 36. JTF South was the Joint Task Force assigned responsibility for planning and executing Just Cause. It was based around the headquarters of XVIII Airborne Corps.

⁷⁹LT Clarence E. Briggs III, Operation Just Cause: Panama, December 1989--A Soldier's Eyewitness Account (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1990), 95.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 95.

⁸¹Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 305.

⁸²Ibid., 308.

⁸³For example, in three weeks of operations, the 2d Brigade, 7th ID, located sixteen major weapons caches and spent \$105,000 in its guns for cash effort. Ibid., 356-357.

⁸⁴See Carla Anne Robbins, "Mixed Message: As U.S. Looks at Haiti, Its Invasion of Panama Shows Limited Results," Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1994, A1, A7, for a discussion of events since Just Cause in Panama.

⁸⁵According to Fishel, Woerner made this recommendation to the JCS, but he never received a decision. Interview conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 23 November 1994.

⁸⁶Fishel, Fog of Peace, 20-21, 24. Fishel argues that the Corps planners did not perceive any relevant implied or explicit tasks in Blind Logic that they needed to incorporate in Just Cause. After briefing Thurman in August and getting approval for their plan, "the Corps planners generally treated the SOUTHCOM staff as irrelevant." As a result, "there was little reason to be surprised about the extensive disconnects between SOUTHCOM and the Corps with respect to Blind Logic."

⁸⁷Shultz, Aftermath of War, 16. Fishel believes that the importance of the change in CINCs was that "The early decision to go from a phased plan to a series of separate plans, while merely cosmetic under Woerner, diverted the attention of General Thurman. Thus the latter focused his attention on the plan to remove the Noriega regime and not on the plan to restore government to Panama." Fishel, 31. It also diverted the attention of the SOUTHCOM staff from the issue. The J-5 planning cell for Blind Logic disbanded in September under the pressure to prepare a counternarcotics campaign plan for the new CINC. Fishel, Fog of Peace, 23.

⁸⁸In an interview with Fishel, he indicated that the SCJ5 had anticipated this decision to solicit volunteers in order to avoid a call-up. His office had already lined up twenty-five willing officers from the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade who had previously worked in Panama and, more importantly, were used to working together. They had only agreed to a thirty-one day deployment, however, and JCS insisted on the 139 day commitment. As a result, only three of

these twenty-five came. The other volunteers had never worked together before arriving in Panama. Fishel Interview, 23 November 1994.

⁸⁹Edward F. Dandar, Jr., "Civil Affairs Operations," in Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, eds., Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 127; See SCJ5 Memorandum, Subject: History of Actions and Activities Preceding JUST CAUSE, 20 June 1990, in Fishel, Fog of Peace, 88.

⁹⁰Fishel establishes the initiation of Promote Liberty with this effort which began on the morning of 20 December. Fishel, Fog of Peace, 32-34.

⁹¹FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 11 January 1993), 3-1 to 3-2, defines two types of civil affairs operations. Civil-military operations are undertaken to support military operations by providing population control, contracting for resources, identifying civilian assets with military utility, and coordinating with civilian agencies. Civil administration occurs when U.S. forces exercise authority that is normally a government function.

⁹²Johnson's use of the term "peacekeeping" demonstrates the confusion which exists over what postconflict operations missions should be called. Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 306.

⁹³Briggs, Eyewitness, 124.

⁹⁴Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 355.

⁹⁵These were termed medical civil affairs programs (MEDCAP). *Ibid.*, 373.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 372.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 354.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 354.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 354-355.

¹⁰⁰Briggs, Eyewitness, 108.

¹⁰¹Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 370.

¹⁰²See Fishel, Fog of Peace, 49-51 and Schultz, Aftermath of War, 53 for a discussion of ICITAP.

¹⁰³For several months, the MSG played the role of the country team for the embassy which was severely undermanned. For information on the MSG, see Fishel, Fog of Peace, 43 and Schultz, Aftermath of War, 33-43.

¹⁰⁴This has since become an annual training event under the auspices of SOUTHCOM's FUERTES CAMINOs exercise program. In 1990, the engineers repaired sixty-nine schools, twenty-one clinics, ninety-nine kilometers of road, and seventeen bridges. Schultz, Aftermath of War, 56-57.

¹⁰⁵Robbins, "Mixed Message," Wall Street Journal, 3 August 1994, A1, A7.

¹⁰⁶Lucius Clay reported that "At one of our regular monthly meetings with the Army district commander he [Eisenhower] made it clear that it was his purpose to support the development of a Military Government organization which could be transferred to civilian control on twenty-four hours notice." Clay, Decision, 56. John Gimbel concluded that "the Army resisted the State Department's attempt to define the Army's function in Germany to include broad political and financial responsibilities, and it refused flatly to accept such responsibilities unless ordered to do so by the President. When Truman assigned it even broader functions that it originally feared, the Army maneuvered speedily and effectively to get out of the occupation business altogether. It sought means, methods, and arguments to accomplish the early transfer of its political, financial, and administrative responsibilities in Germany to the Department of State." John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 26.

¹⁰⁷Quoted in Schultz, Aftermath of War, 19.

¹⁰⁸Ziemke, Occupation, 445.

¹⁰⁹Lucius D. Clay, "Proconsul of a People, by Another People, for Both Peoples," in Robert Wolfe, ed., Proconsuls, 107. Dale Clark

observed: "It is...extremely difficult to transfer leadership from the hands of tactical military leaders to a corps of administrators even though the latter may have been placed in uniform. The 'regulars' of the victorious military organizations are at the height of their prestige; they are a 'going concern'; and they arrived on the scene first. It is not in the nature of power to abdicate." Dale Clark, "Conflicts over Planning at Staff Headquarters," in Friedrich, American Experiences, 213. See also Friedrich, "Three Phases," in Friedrich, American Experiences, 245 and Zink, Military Government, 40.

¹¹⁰Briggs, Eyewitness, 134.

¹¹¹FM 100-5, iv.

¹¹²FM 100-25 defines Civil Affairs and PSYOP as principal missions. Moreover, the Special Operations Imperatives it provides offer excellent guidance to any forces conducting postconflict operations. These are: 1) Understand the operational environment; 2) Recognize political implications; 3) Facilitate interagency activities; 4) Engage the threat discriminately; 5) Consider long-term effects; 6) Ensure legitimacy and credibility of SO [substitute U.S. Army] activities; 7) Anticipate and control psychological effects; 8) Apply capabilities indirectly; 9) Develop multiple options; 10) Ensure long-term sustainment; 11) Provide sufficient intelligence; and 12) Balance security and synchronization.

Department of the Army, FM 100-25, Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 12 December 1991), 2-15. FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, also specifically addresses postconflict operations in its discussion of "consolidation PSYOP" which is the "support of military consolidated operations during the reconstruction phase of military operations and the support of peacetime activities." In subsequent development of the mission, the doctrine establishes PSYOP considerations for liberated and occupied areas, with the major goal being to orient and reeducate the population. Department of the Army, FM 33-1, Psychological Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 18 February 1993), 3-5 to 3-10.

¹¹³Department of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 3-3. The previous edition of this manual was dated 1985. It

is interesting to note that the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 did not list FM 41-10 in its list of related publications.

¹¹⁴FM 100-5 (1993), 3-7 to 3-12. This contrasts sharply with the 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations, which did not address postconflict operations. It discussed only two stages of operations--strategic deployment and employment--in an abbreviated discussion of contingency operations. FM 100-5 (1986), 170-172.

¹¹⁵FM 100-5, 3-11.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 3-12. The key to this claim is "staying power." The U.S. Marine Corps has many of these same capabilities, but lack the logistical infrastructure for a sustained effort. The Marine Corps has no active duty Civil Affairs or PSYOP capability. See Colonel James M. Hayes, "Panama PROMOTE LIBERTY After Action Report," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1990, 60.

¹¹⁸FM 100-5, 3-11.

¹¹⁹Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations, Initial Draft (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 July 1994), 3-59.

¹²⁰Ibid. Interestingly, the manual also cautions corps commanders to "be aware of mission creep, where end state conditions change, requiring a continuation of military operations."

¹²¹Ibid., 3-60.

¹²²FM 71-100, 2-13.

¹²³Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations, Initial Draft (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 July 1994), 2-14.

¹²⁴Ibid., 2-15.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1993), 6-14.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹FM 100-5, 13-6 to 13-7.

¹³⁰FM 71-10-2, Infantry Division Operations--Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, includes postconflict operations as part of its discussion of OOTW.

¹³¹Colonel Alexander M. Walczak, "Conflict Termination--Transitioning from Warrior to Constable: A Primer," USAWC Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 1.

¹³²FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 September 1990), foreword.

¹³³Briggs, Eyewitness, 4.

¹³⁴LTC Thomas E. Hanlon, "The Operational Level of War: After the Smoke Clears," USAWC Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 1988), 35.

¹³⁵This view was captured by the comments of an NCO in the 7th Infantry Division in Panama. Expressing disenchantment with the policing missions his squad had received, he said: "I don't think that should be part of our missions...We should have been relieved by M.P.s." Donnelly, Just Cause, 379. Standing alone, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, contributes to the impression that postconflict operations will be conducted by specialists, leaving the warriors free to redeploy and prepare for the next war.

¹³⁶There is only one active duty CA battalion: the rest of the nation's civil affairs capabilities exist in three reserve CA commands and two reserve CA brigades. See FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, for a discussion of the CA structure.

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